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Abstract
Background. Counterfactual thinking involves mentally simulating
alternatives to reality. The current article reviews literature pertaining
to the relevance counterfactual thinking has for the quality of medical
decision making. Although earlier counterfactual thought research
concluded that counterfactuals have important benefits for the indi-
vidual, there are reasons to believe that counterfactual thinking is
also associated with dysfunctional consequences. Of particular focus
is whether or not medical experience, and its influence on counterfac-
tual thinking, actually informs or improves medical practice. It is
hypothesized that relatively more probable decision alternatives, fol-
lowed by undesirable outcomes and counterfactual thought responses,
can be abandoned for relatively less probable decision alternatives. 
Design and Methods. Building on earlier research demonstrating
that counterfactual thinking can impede memory and learning in a
decision paradigm with undergraduate students, the current study
examines the extent to which earlier findings can be generalized to
practicing physicians (N=10). Participants were asked to complete 60
trials of a computerized Monty Hall Problem simulation. Learning by
experience was operationalized as the frequency of switch-decisions. 
Results. Although some learning was evidenced by a general
increase in switch-decision frequency across block trials, the extent of
learning demonstrated was not ideal, nor practical.
Conclusions. A simple, multiple-trial, decision paradigm demon-
strated that doctors fail to learn basic decision-outcome associations
through experience. An agenda for future research, which tests the
functionality of reference points (other than counterfactual alterna-
tives) for the purposes of medical decision making, is proposed.
Introduction
A doctor must decide upon one of two treatments (A or B) for a
patient with a serious disease. The doctor decides on Treatment A and,
unfortunately, the patient dies. To the extent that Treatment B was
previously considered and feasible, the doctor will mentally simulate
what might have been had he/she selected Treatment B. In fact, the
more likely the doctor was to actually select Treatment B, the more
extreme the affective reaction he/she will experience in response to
the unfortunate outcome.1 This type of mental simulation is known in
philosophy and psychology as counterfactual thinking,2,3 because it
involves mentally simulating alternatives to reality. Thus, a doctor may
mentally change the perceived antecedents of an outcome and mental-
ly play out the consequences once the facts are known. 
Counterfactual thoughts tend to take one of two directions.4
Because people often take at face value desirable decisions and out-
comes,5 they rarely engage in downward counterfactual thinking, that
is, mental simulation of alternatives that are worse than reality. Thus,
the large majority of counterfactual thoughts are upward, whereby
people mentally simulate alternatives that are better than reality in
response to undesirable outcomes,6 unexpected outcomes,3 and per-
ceptually abnormal events.7 It is important to note that downward and
upward counterfactuals tend to be triggered by different types of
events and serve different purposes. Downward counterfactuals tend
to follow close calls or relatively satisfying outcomes, lead to relatively
positive affect, and theoretically provide behavioural prescriptions for
how one might prevent unsatisfying outcomes in the future. Upward
counterfactuals tend to follow relatively unsatisfying outcomes, lead to
relatively negative affect and theoretically provide behavioural pre-
scriptions for how one might promote satisfying outcomes in the
future. Although other important distinctions have been made in the
counterfactual thinking literature,8-11 they are beyond the scope of the
current analysis. 
A critical aspect of counterfactual thoughts is their tendency to
serve as important reference points and standards of comparison for
social perception and judgment. It has long been known that mental
comparison cases directly shape affective, cognitive, and behavioural
reactions to events.12-14 As suggested by general judgment and deci-
sion making research, as it pertains to mentally simulated and for-
gone alternatives,15,16 the use of counterfactuals as references points
in judging the quality and directions of medical practice is ubiquitous.Consequences of counterfactual thinking
The influence and consequences of upward counterfactual thoughts
are well documented, and include affective reactions,4,17 judgments of
blame and responsibility,18 victim compensation,19 experienced
regret/perceived regret,2,12,20 and judgments of causality.7 Many empir-
ical approaches to counterfactual thinking advocate for the position
that counterfactuals are functional.4,9,10,21,22 The crux of the argument
Significance for public health
The quality of healthcare depends heavily on the judgments and decisions
made by doctors and other medical professionals. Findings from this
research indicate that doctors fail to learn basic decision-outcome associa-
tions through experience, as evidenced by the sample’s tendency to select
the optimal decision strategy in only 50% of 60 trials (each of which was fol-
lowed by veridical feedback). These findings suggest that professional expe-
rience is unlikely to enhance the quality of medical decision making. Thus,
this research has implications for understanding how doctors’ reactions to
medical outcomes shape their judgments and affect the degree to which
their future treatment intentions are consistent with clinical practice guide-
lines. The current research is integrated with earlier research on counter-
factual thinking, which appears to be a primary element inhibiting the learn-
ing of decision-outcome associations. An agenda for future research is pro-
posed.
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is that counterfactuals are essential to subsequent decision making
and planning because they offer important behavioural prescriptions
for learning, behaviour modification, and future decisions. With regard
to counterfactual thinking’s place in medicine, Höfler argued that
counterfactual thinking is important to causal reasoning,23 as it serves
as the basis of causal thinking in epidemiology. Furthermore, Höfler
contended that counterfactuals provide a framework for many statisti-
cal procedures, enabling medical professionals to estimate causal
effects, and that the counterfactual approach is useful for teaching pur-
poses.
However, here it is argued that counterfactual thinking can have
undesirable (dysfunctional) as well as desirable (functional) conse-
quences. In fact, recent research links counterfactual thinking to dis-
tortions of reality in memory,24 increased risk-taking/gambling,6 and
hindsight bias.6,25 Counterfactual thinking also appears to be a precur-
sor to outcome bias,16 whereby people judge the quality of a decision on
the basis of its associated outcome rather than on its prior probability. 
More important to the current analysis is the possibility that coun-
terfactual thinking negatively influences causal reasoning and learn-
ing. Earlier research on counterfactual thinking showed that counter-
factuals greatly influence causal ascriptions.7 However, the work of
Mandel and Lehman conclusively demonstrates that when people gen-
erate counterfactuals they tend to think of ways that an undesirable
outcome may have been prevented.26 Only when people engage in
direct causal reasoning (i.e., considering the causes of such outcomes
rather than focusing on what might have been) do they appear to gen-
erate antecedents that actually covary with the outcomes in question.
Thus, counterfactuals may covary with the perceived causes of out-
comes, but they do not necessarily lead the social perceiver to generate
the correct causes of outcomes. Similarly, statisticians, such as
Dawid,27 have argued that the counterfactual concept is unable to solve
the fundamental problems of causal inference in the first place because
any particular individual, at a fixed time, can observe an outcome only
under a single condition.
In any case, we know that counterfactual thinking and highly salient
and cognitively available representations of undesirable outcomes
influence both causal reasoning and decision making in medicine. A
doctor’s last undesirable experience with a patient can be the most
influential factor affecting his/her actions and decisions in the next
similar case that he/she faces.28,29
Perhaps the most devastating consequence of counterfactual think-
ing in medical practice is when it serves as the catalyst for changing
otherwise optimal decision making strategies to suboptimal decision
strategies. It is clear that good decisions, as defined by their associa-
tions with highly probable, desirable outcomes, sometimes result in
undesirable outcomes. It is also clear that bad decisions, as defined by
their associations with highly probable undesirable outcomes, some-
times result in desirable outcomes. However, people possess an out-
come bias when they judge the quality of decisions. That is, even when
they know that a decision alternative is the most favourable, given its
associated prior probability of success, people cannot help but allow the
outcome to influence their perceived quality of the decision; and there
appears to be nothing special about the medical profession that immu-
nizes medical professionals from this apparent pitfall in judgment. A
critical component to this bias is the consideration that a more desir-
able outcome could have or would have occurred if another decision
alternative had been selected. The easier it is for people to imagine
those alternatives, the greater the affective reaction to reality, and the
more likely they will follow the prescriptions of their counterfactuals in
the future. 
Research conducted by Ratner and Herbst demonstrates that good
decisions can also be overwhelmed by the negative emotional reactions
associated with undesirable outcomes that people can easily mentally
undo.30 Even when people recall that a particular decision alternative
was more successful than other decision alternatives in the past, they
will often abandon such decision alternatives if they focus on their
affective reactions to similar previous events.
In medicine, as with many other scientifically-based practices, a pri-
ori probabilities are rarely certain. This is why one of the biggest influ-
ences on medical decision making is one’s professional experience
(despite the existence of empirically-based clinical practice guide-
lines).31,32 The focus of the current analysis is to examine the role of
counterfactual thinking in medical decision making and experiential
learning. Of particular interest is whether counterfactual thinking aids
or impedes learning in medical practice. Earlier research on the impact
of counterfactual thinking suggests that counterfactuals enhance
learning.21,33 However, such demonstrations failed to consider the
impact of counterfactuals on memory and perceived skill level. On the
basis of research distinguishing counterfactual content for the self and
others,34 metacognitive findings suggesting that people are inaccurate
in their self-appraisals,35 and the link between hindsight bias and
counterfactual thinking,6,25 Petrocelli et al.36 hypothesized that coun-
terfactuals can inhibit improvements in academic performance by pro-
viding a false sense of competence. Their studies showed that studying
behaviour and improvement on standardized exam items were inhibit-
ed by spontaneous counterfactual thought responses. When Petrocelli
et al. manipulated the salience of counterfactual thinking, they found
that the negative relationship between counterfactual thought frequen-
cy and exam improvement was mediated by studying behaviour.
Furthermore, perceived skill mediated the link between counterfactual
thinking and studying behaviour. Thus, consistent with earlier notions
that people discontinue practice when they believe they have reached
mastery of a bod of knowledge,35 Petrocelli et al.’s participants failed to
practice academic material when they overestimated their abilities,
and their perceived abilities were partially a function of their tendency
to explain away undesirable outcomes with counterfactual thoughts. 
The research conducted by Petrocelli et al.36 involved conscious and
deliberate decision making. However, the link between counterfactual
thinking and decision making can also be mediated by learning inhibi-
tion. Another set of studies, conducted by Petrocelli et al.,37 supports
this claim. In their paradigm, participants made decisions to buy one of
two stocks across multiple trials (i.e., sequential years) after observing
value-by-month graphs. As participants completed subsequent trials
(i.e., year to year), the better of the two stocks simply alternated, creat-
ing a simple concept rule to be learned (i.e., A, B, A, B, A, B…).
Interestingly, the majority of Petrocelli et al.’s participants failed to
learn this concept rule after 30 consecutive trials. Consistent with their
hypothesis, learning was less likely to occur as the frequency of coun-
terfactualized trials increased. Furthermore, the relationship between
counterfactual thinking and learning was mediated by the degree to
which participants had overestimated their recent performance. The
experimenters concluded that upward counterfactuals can inhibit
learning in at least one of two ways. First, focusing on alternative deci-
sions, outcomes, or both can essentially distort the feedback process.
Rather than encoding and decoding reality (i.e., the actual decisions
and outcomes), participants may have recalled an alternative decision-
outcome event to the extent that they made losing decisions. For
instance, if a participant lost the third trial, but counterfactualized it
away, they may be more likely to recall the following outcomes: A, B, B,
B, A, B…; and less likely to learn the actual pattern. A second possibil-
ity also implicates memory distortions via counterfactuals: participants
who counterfactualized losing trials were more likely to overestimate
their performance and were less likely to learn the more distal pattern
emerging. Feeling that one is performing better than he/she actually is
might attenuate either his/her motivation, or perceived need to
improve one’s outcomes by testing other strategies.
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Counterfactual thinking and the Monty Hall problem
Because the demonstrations of dysfunctional counterfactual think-
ing cited above were derived within relatively complex systems, they do
not rule out alternative explanations. Petrocelli and Harris sought to
examine the possibility that counterfactuals inhibit experiential learn-
ing within a very simple decision paradigm (i.e., the Monty Hall three
doors paradigm).38 This research asked two basic questions: i) do peo-
ple learn optimal decision strategies from their experiences? and ii)
what role does counterfactual thinking play in learning or not learning
these strategies? 
The current research and that of Petrocelli and Harris employed the
Monty Hall Problem (MHP) to investigate the answers to these ques-
tions. The MHP is a two-stage decision problem popularized by the
game show Let’s Make a Deal. In the classic version, a MHP-contestant
is presented with three doors, one of which conceals a prize and two of
which conceal something relatively undesirable, such as a goat.
Importantly, the prize and goats do not change positions once they have
been assigned to a door and Monty (the host) knows which door con-
ceals the prize. The contestant selects a door, and Monty always opens
an unselected door that does not reveal the prize. The contestant is
then faced with the decision to stick with his/her initial door or to
switch to the other remaining door. Intuitively, the decision to stick or
switch appears to be arbitrary as the probability of winning the prize
appears to be 0.50 for both options. However, this assumption is math-
ematically incorrect. The probability of winning a MHP-trial using the
stick-decision is the same as that when the contestant first begins (i.e.,
0.33), and the probability of winning using the switch-decision is 0.67.
Many people fail to see the advantage of uniform switching in the MHP
and resist most explanations supporting it.39 In fact, the probability of
winning the prize through switching increases as a function of the
number of doors (i.e., 1: probability of selecting the winning door with
the first guess). For example, if Monty presented 10 doors (one prize
and nine goats), and revealed eight goats after the initial door is select-
ed, the respective probabilities of a win with the stick- and switch-deci-
sions would be 0.10 and 0.90.
The MHP is an ideal task, for the purpose of studying the link
between counterfactual thinking and learning as learning can be easi-
ly operationalized as a decision maker’s switch-decision frequency.40-42
Is it possible for people to learn the MHP-solution from repeatedly play-
ing the game? After repeated trials, one might expect people to learn
the associations between switching and winning and sticking and los-
ing (at least implicitly). After all, there are only three doors, two possi-
ble strategies, two possible outcomes, and players will win twice as
many trials with the switch-decision as they do with the stick-decision. 
Granberg and Brown’s participants played 50 trials of a computer-
simulated MHP.40 Switch-decision frequency reached approximately
50% in the final block of 10 trials. In two variations, the incentive to
switch was increased (i.e., one point awarded for stick-wins and two
points awarded for switch-wins or one point for stick-wins and four
points for switch-wins); nonetheless, participants switched in only 63%
and 85% of the final 10 trials, respectively. Their participants also tend-
ed to believe that success in the MHP was a matter of luck rather than
control when no extra incentive to employ the switch-decision was
used, and only slightly above the mid-point on a lucky-control response
item when the incentive was employed. Furthermore, Gilovich, Medvec,
and Chen demonstrated that people are typically more motivated to
reduce cognitive dissonance following a switch-loss than a stick-loss.43
Petrocelli and Harris proposed that mentally simulating alternatives
to reality (i.e., counterfactual thoughts),38 particularly in response to
switch-losses, inhibits learning and increases the likelihood of deci-
sion makers irrationally committing to a losing strategy. They also pro-
posed that a biased memory process mediates this relationship. In
Study 1, participants were asked to complete 60 computerized trials of
the MHP and to list their thought-response after each trial.
Counterfactuals were clearly involved as thought responses to MHP tri-
als. Similar to previous research, the average switch-decision percent-
age per 10-trial block peaked at about 38%. In Study 2, Petrocelli and
Harris directly manipulated the salience of counterfactual alternatives
by spoon-feeding half of their participants with counterfactual state-
ments; the other half of their sample was not spoon-fed counterfactu-
als. The average switch-decision percentage per 10-trial block peaked
at about 40% and 55% respectively. More importantly, Petrocelli and
Harris found the counterfactual-learning inhibition link to be mediat-
ed by a memory distortion biased against the switch-decision. 
The findings of the Petrocelli and Harris studies suggest that
upward counterfactual thinking inhibits associative learning in the
MHP by creating a false association between switching and losing. That
is, Monty Hall contestants focus on an alternative strategy (i.e., stick-
ing) following switch-losses (e.g., If only I hadn’t switched) to a greater
extent than they do following stick-losses. Furthermore, people are
more likely to overestimate their switch-losses than they are their
stick-losses. In other words, the thought-processing that transpires
once the outcome in the MHP is known may lead to associative illu-
sions in memory. Particularly, rather than associating the switch-deci-
sion with winning and the stick-decision with losing, the incorrect
assumption of equal win-probabilities may be maintained. 
Is there anything unique about medical professionals that guard
them against the dysfunction of counterfactual thinking as it pertains
to learning from their professional experiences? If doctors are well-
positioned to learn from experience in something as simple as the
MHP, surely they would be well-positioned to learn from their experi-
ences in their own specialty. This was the focus of the current study.Current study
Practicing physicians were recruited to complete 60 computerized
trials of the MHP. Similar to procedures of the Petrocelli and Harris
studies, learning was operationalized as a decision maker’s switch-
decision frequency. If experience is sufficient for learning the associa-
tion between switch-decisions and winning, as well as stick-decisions
and losing, switch-decision frequency should naturally increase as par-
ticipants progress through the trials.
Design and MethodsParticipants and procedure
Practicing physicians (N=10, seven males) in the state or North
Carolina, USA were recruited to participate in the current study.
Participants reported an average age of 43.50, and an average of 15.00
(SD=5.44) years of post-medical school practice. The areas of special-
ization consisted of two doctors in internal medicine, six in family and
general practice, and two in paediatrics. 
Participants were met individually in their places of work, received a
brief oral introduction to the study and were provided with a laptop
computer. All study materials were presented using MediaLab v2012
research software.44 The study was described as an examination of how
people make decisions. The instructions of the study were self-paced,
and participants advanced the instructions by pressing the space bar or
a response key. Participants were asked to complete 60 computerized
trials of the MHP, and instructed to win as many trials as possible. Monty Hall problem
Participants were introduced to the MHP, and were informed that
they were to play 60 trials of a computerized version of the game-show
popularly known as Let’s Make a Deal. They then read the following
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description: in this game, Monty Hall, a thoroughly honest game-show
host, has placed money behind one of three doors. There is a goat behind
each of the other doors. Monty will ask you to pick a door. Then he will
open one of the other doors (one you did not pick). Then, Monty will ask
you to make a final choice between the remaining doors, and you will
win whatever is behind the door you select. Monty always knows where
the money is and does not change its location once you begin a trial. Try
to win as much money as possible. 
During game-play, the trial-number was displayed at the top of the
screen-frame. For each trial, the prize-revealing door was randomized
by the computer software. At the beginning of each trial, three closed
doors were presented, as well as three response buttons labelled 1, 2,
and 3. After participants selected their initial door, the following
screen-frame read: You picked Door X. Let’s see what is behind one of
the doors you did not pick. Importantly, when Monty was permitted to
open one of two doors (in cases whereby the money was behind the ini-
tially selected door), a randomly selected goat-concealing door was
opened. The next screen-frame read: Behind Door Z, a door you did not
pick, is a goat. You picked Door X. You now have the option to stay with
your original door, Door X, or you may switch to the other remaining
door. It’s up to you. What would you like to do? Participants made their
decision by clicking one of two response buttons labelled Stick and
Switch. Each trial concluded with the following message: Your final
choice is Door X [Y]. The money is behind Door X [Y]. You Win [Lose]
this trial.
On average, the entire session was completed in approximately 15
minutes. At the conclusion of each session, participants were debriefed
and thanked for their time. 
Results
For each participant, the proportion of switch-decisions for each
block of 10 trials was calculated. These data are displayed in Figure 1
along with data reported by Petrocelli and Harris.38 A repeated meas-
ures analysis of variance was employed to analyse the difference in pro-
portions across the six blocks of 10 trials. This analysis produced a sta-
tistically significant main effect of block, F(5,45)=3.00, P<0.05,
h2=0.25, suggesting that some learning did occur during the task.
However, not until the comparison between block 2 and block 6 is there
a statistically significant difference in switch decisions, t(45)=2.99,
P<0.01. As displayed in Figure 1, the rate of switch-decisions clearly did
not exceed that of earlier samples. Furthermore, a one-sample t-test
revealed that even the switch-decision total for block 6 was not signifi-
cantly different from the chance-probability-switch-proportion of 0.50,
t(9)=-0.22, ns. Thus, although there is some statistically significant
data suggestive of learning, the degree to which it may have occurred
appears to be practically insignificant.
Discussion and Conclusions
The current findings are consistent with earlier research demon-
strating that learning is inhibited in a multiple-trial MHP paradigm.
Similar to undergraduate student samples, physicians appear to make
the same decision error repeatedly. Despite winning twice as much via
switching than sticking, on average the sample made sub-optimal
stick-decisions (a 0.33 probability of winning any particular trial) as
much as they made optimal switch-decisions (a 0.67 probability of win-
ning any particular trial). This tendency was evident even after 60 MHP
trials. Although the sample size of the current study was relatively
small, the within-subjects nature of the design adds to the validity of
the conclusions. Furthermore, the striking similarity between the cur-
rent data and that pertaining to larger samples suggests that there is
little reason to expect larger samples to lead to different conclusions.38
The MHP is mirrored by medical practice when doctors and their
patients are faced with the choice between three treatment options, all
of which have a low, but equal, probability of success (e.g., 0.33).
Similar to medical practice whereby people are motivated to mentally
undo undesirable outcomes, every loss is almost a win in the multiple-
trial MHP paradigm. This makes the MHP ideal for eliciting counterfac-
tual thoughts. Although they clearly complicate learning in the MHP,
the dysfunction of counterfactuals is not found only in their generation,
but in the haste to follow their prescriptions in the future. The multi-
ple-trial MHP paradigm is also ideal as an experimental learning para-
digm in that it presents little external information to distract the indi-
vidual from learning the solution. Speed in learning the solution
depends greatly on accurately encoding reality rather than its alterna-
tives. If suboptimal decision making runs rampant with something as
simple as the MHP, how can we expect doctors to make optimal deci-
sions in more complex situations? The data suggest that there is noth-
ing special about professional medical training or experiences that will
enhance the learning of doctors in such situations. Surely, this is not
to suggest that doctors never learn from their experiences, but it
appears that learning via experience is considerably slower than one
might hope in contexts that are especially likely to enhance counterfac-
tual thought generation. The current data further suggests that med-
ical decision making should be based on something more than experi-
ence alone. 
The current data suggest that doctors do not maximize their learn-
ing from their experiences the way they should, or at the rate that we
might hope that they would. One speculation is that people do learn
something from experience, but their learning appears to be inhibited
by their endorsement of a priori strategies followed-up by confirmation
bias,45 and other cognitive illusions, to justify their continued use.
Such speculation is supported by three findings. First, the decision/out-
come that occurred the least (and was least likely to occur to begin
with), tends to be overrepresented in memory – see Study 2 of
Petrocelli and Harris.38 This is because switch-losses are counterfactu-
alized away much more frequently than stick-losses. It is more painful
to experience failure when that failure follows changes to one’s deci-
[Journal of Public Health Research 2013; 2:e24] [page 139]
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sion than no changes to his/her decision, and people appear to over-
remember these instances. Such findings are in line with over-recall-
ing changes, in comparison to lack of changes, made to multiple choice
exam items that are marked incorrect.46
Second, it has been demonstrated that counterfactual-learning inhi-
bition link is mediated by the memory distortion biased against the
switch decision – see Study 1 and Study 2 of Petrocelli and Harris.
Finally, the multiple-trial MHP paradigm demonstrates that distorted
memory for switch-losses encourages significantly greater preference
for the stick-decision, as expressed in both verbal and behavioural
measures. Thus, counterfactuals can even be correct for proximal
events, yet prescribe dysfunctional implications for the future. Counterfactual thinking in medical practice and training 
When and where does counterfactual thinking emerge for doctors in
their medical practice and training? Similar to previous research,
counterfactual thinking is likely to emerge when doctors experience
unexpected outcomes, undesirable outcomes, repeatable situations,
come close to reaching more desirable outcomes, and feel some degree
of subjective control over the situations in which they encounter.
Counterfactuals are likely to emerge in the minds of medical profes-
sionals and are likely to be expressed through the direct communica-
tions between attending and resident physicians, nurses, and all med-
ical professionals involved in the care of a patient. 
Medical training is very experiential, and often times a physician’s
unique experiences are most cognitively available. Consistent with the
notion of the availability heuristic (i.e., estimating the frequency or
likelihood of an event based on the ease with cases come to mind),
some clinical researchers have concluded that what influences clinical
choices the most is the physician’s last bad experience.28,29 Thus, it is
not hard to imagine how counterfactuals, in response to undesirable
medical outcomes, can affect subsequent decision making in similar
cases.
An experiential modality of medical training, the morbidity and mor-
tality conference (MMC), also happens to be a breading ground for
counterfactual thinking. MMCs are widespread and serve as an impor-
tant medium of communication among physicians and change in med-
ical practice within an institution. They are in every teaching hospital
in the United States. Meetings are held weekly and often mandatory for
resident physicians and full-time faculty. The primary goal of the MMC
session is to serve as the main didactic learning session dedicated to
developing competency in practice-based learning and improvement
and system-based practice. It also serves as a key element in promoting
quality improvement and patient safety. The objectives of the MMC
often include: i) identifying and presenting patient cases involving
adverse outcomes; ii) analysing the pertinent facts of a case in a sys-
tematic and nonpunitive manner (in order to identify possible con-
tributing or causative factors for the adverse outcome, or possible sys-
tem-based issues contributing to the outcome or that were sub-optimal
in preventing or responding to the outcome); and iii) identifying areas
for improvement in the care. The typical MMC session includes a case
presentation in timeline format, a brief literature review relevant to the
case in question, the identification of key issues leading to the unde-
sired outcome, and the identification of workgroups to address the key
issues.47,48 Not only are counterfactual thoughts often expressed dur-
ing the presentation of these specific cases,6 but often attendees of the
conference voice their own counterfactuals. Concurrence often
emerges in support of such counterfactuals from other attendees.
Because consensus often breeds certainty,49 case presenters and atten-
dees may often feel fully justified in altering decision strategies for
future similar cases based on the counterfactual prescriptions generat-
ed during the conference. The MMC is one way in which medical prac-
tice improves in quality and safety. However, it is unlikely that optimal
decision strategies are uniformly developed through such a modality. 
Medical decision making is greatly shaped by a doctor’s experiences
and vicarious experiences.23,31,32,50,51 Through years of experience, doc-
tors will gain an abundance of experiential data. Their unique experi-
ences are what make them specialists. A doctor’s explanations (or
causal ascriptions) for medical outcomes inevitably affect his/her deci-
sions about diagnoses and treatments in future cases; each case can
serve as an important learning experience.
To what degree do doctors monitor their data accurately and shape
their judgments and decisions accordingly? To what degree do pre-
existing hypotheses of causation, confirmation biases, emotions, and
the motivation to be correct cloud the data? The current research find-
ings, and those of Petrocelli and Harris,38 call the accuracy of such data
collection processes into question. Counterfactual thinking appears to
be one cognitive activity that can distort the data collection process and
perceived implications for subsequent decisions. Similar to losing a
MHP trial via switching, doctors may make decisions associated with
the highest probability of success (e.g., adhering strictly to clinical
practice guidelines) and still experience undesirable outcomes for
their patients. In such cases, doctors may mentally simulate alternative
actions that may or may not prescribe optimal actions for the future. Research agenda for alternative reference points formedical decision making
The problem with counterfactual thoughts is that they often serve as
faulty reference points for judging reality and decisions. Thus, they
sometimes mislead people to adopt beliefs about the actual causes of
events and the ways to prevent undesirable outcomes in the future that
are simply incorrect. Certainly, counterfactuals may be correct and lead
to new insights and advances. However, there appear to be basic ele-
ments that must be in place for any particular counterfactual thought
to contribute to improvements in medical decision making; these
include: i) correct casual antecedent, ii) accurate memory for actual
occurrences, iii) ability to change behaviour in the direction of the
counterfactual prescriptions, iv) motivation to follow the prescriptions,
v) a similar situation encountered in the future, and vi) successfully
making the necessary behavioural change.
Because there appear to be many links in the chain (between coun-
terfactual thinking and functional medical decision making) that can
be broken, perhaps medical professionals should use more functional
reference points than those afforded by counterfactuals. Each of the
proposed alternative reference points (described below) warrants
future research attention.Consider-alternatives-strategy
Doctors are unlikely to stop generating counterfactual thoughts in
response to undesirable outcomes, nor should they even attempt to. A
more functional reference point for judging the medical course of action,
and determining whether or not it should change in the future, should be
done by first considering the possibility that the counterfactual might be
wrong. Studies in debiasing suggest that simply considering the oppo-
site, or alternative ways in which an event might have unfolded, can help
to prevent tunnel vision leading to hindsight bias.52-55 Thus, when doc-
tors begin to engage in counterfactual thought experiments considering
multiple upward and downward counterfactuals may help to put the
default counterfactual in clearer perspective. Causal reasoning
Counterfactual thinking is often effortless and occurs automatically
when undesirable outcomes are encountered.18 Counterfactualizing an
event may clarify ways in which a particular outcome may have been
prevented, but often it fails to be associated with adopting causal
ascriptions that actually covary with the outcome in question. Mandel
and Lehman showed that when people are asked to consider a scenario
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and asked to list counterfactuals they tend to list things that might have
prevented the outcome and not necessarily the things that that covary
with those outcomes.26 However, when people are asked to list things
that might have caused the outcome, they actually list things that
covary with those outcomes. This practice would seem to lead to much
more accurate causal ascriptions and more functional prescriptions for
future similar cases. Advocacy and communication of the actuarial reasoning approach
Advocacy for both clinical vs. actuarial reasoning in medical practice
is an ongoing debate.56,57 Despite the fact that medicine is a science
and that it often entails varying degrees of uncertainty, doctors rarely
communicate their work as such to their patients. Changing the way
that medical professionals, and the masses they serve, think about
medicine is perhaps the only way to accept that sometimes bad out-
comes follow good decision making strategies. If doctors can change
how they and their patients think about medicine (e.g., thwarting the
super-person scheme), they are much more likely to accept some
degree of the inevitable fallibility of medical science and many errors
can be reframed as an unfortunate part of the process. Doctors are
trained to behave like clinicians, but what might errors look like if they
were also trained to behave like statisticians and communicate this
role to their patients? As Groopman argued,29 the healthy perspective of
medicine embraces uncertainty: Paradoxically, taking uncertainty into
account can enhance a physician’s therapeutic effectiveness, because it
demonstrates his honesty, his willingness to be more engaged with his
patients, his commitment to the reality of the situation rather than
resorting to evasion, half-truth, and even lies. (p. 155). Education in statistics and basic judgment and decision making
Education in statistics and basic judgment and decision making is
simply inadequate in medical training. Awareness and recognition of
cognitive biases and possible errors in one’s judgments can lead to
more functional decision making. For instance, studies reported by
Gigerenzer and his colleagues suggests that doctor’s often apply a sub-
stantial degree of guesswork to the diagnostic processes as opposed to
calculating Bayesian conditional probabilities.58,59 In one example,
Gigerenzer and his colleagues showed that 60% of 160 gynaecologists
estimated the chances that a woman has breast cancer, after receiving
a positive mammogram, to be 81% or greater. However, the chances are
only 10%, and doctors appear to forget about the frequency of false pos-
itive test results that mammograms produce. To make better estimates
of conditional probabilities, Gigerenzer advocates that doctors think as
frequentists rather than probabilists. Doctors and patients would seem
to make better treatment decisions and fewer errors if they know that
the probability of a serious condition is actually only 0.10 than 0.85 –
this type of knowledge should also help to reduce the likelihoods of
common errors that come through over-testing, over-medicating, and
over-treating in general. Not only do patients deserve to know what a
positive or negative test result actually means, but it is critical that
physicians know what test results mean as well, and they should be
able to communicate this to their patients.Evidence-based medicine and clinical practice guidelines
Because medical decision making is a complex task, physicians also
rely on clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) that aim to enhance medical
decisions and eliminate unnecessary and unjustified treatment vari-
ance.60 However, conscious non-adherence to CPGs is common among
physicians.61-65 Ambivalence toward evidence-based medicine (EBM)
and clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) is quite ubiquitous in the med-
ical field.66 According to Pelletier,67 20% to 50% of conventional medical
care, and almost all of surgery, is not adequately supported by EBM. A
recent meta-analysis suggests that physicians’ quality of care decreas-
es as they gain experience.68 Some of this variation is explained by the
degree to which doctors adhere to CPGs. When CPGs fail, doctors often
fail to recognize that good decision strategies, such as adhering to
appropriate CPGs, are not always followed by good outcomes, leaving
them at risk for switching from an optimal to a suboptimal decision
strategy. Determining how physicians process the success of treat-
ments as a possible source of non-adherence to CPGs is crucial, as
research suggests that the most serious medical errors in diagnoses
and treatment selection result from faulty reasoning.69,70
The current theoretical framework is based on the efficacy of actuar-
ial decision making and the assumption that CPG-adherence enhances
healthcare. Healthcare service delivery can be improved by elucidating
how doctors process medical outcomes and how their processing
affects CPG-adherence. The obvious motive of high performance and
aspects of training and continuing education through morbidity and
mortality conferences, for example, can prompt doctors to engage in
counterfactual thinking often, develop confidence in their counterfac-
tual thoughts, and become subject to the outcome bias. However, rather
than employ counterfactual alternatives as reference points to judge
the quality of medical decisions and form prescriptions for the future,
doctors may perform better by comparing their decisions to available
CPGs. 
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